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I NOTES AND COMMENTS ,
institutions remain to be seen. Whatever the trend in the rest of
the country, In re Carter indicates that the North Carolina courts
stand ready to remedy any deprivation of due process in the appli-
cation of the student disciplinary system of the University."0 As
to defects in the system itself, the courts are unlikely fo insist that
the University establish a microcosm of the common law. They
may nevertheless find that the present system in the University lacks
some fundamentals of due process to which the student is entitled.17
WILLIS PADGETT WHICHARIJ
Constitutional Law-Extension of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination
The petitioner in Malloy v. Hogan was on probation from a
sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to a gambling charge. He
was brought before a referee conducting an inquiry into alleged
gambling activity in Connecticut and asked questions about the cir-
cumstances surrounding his prior arrest, among which were:
(1) for whom did he work on September 11, 1959; (2) who.
selected and paid his counsel in connection with his arrest on that
date and subsequent conviction; (3) who selected and paid his
bondsman; (4) who paid his fine'; (5) what was the name of
the tenant in the apartment in which he was arrested; and (6), -
did he know John Bergoti.
2
After refusing to answer each question "on the grounds it may
tend to incriminate me," he was adjudged in contempt3 and im-
prisoned until he would cooperate. He applied for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment granted a privilege against self-incrimination.' A lower
state court denied the writ, and the highest state court affirmea.b
"For example, deprivation of due process may. result as in Carter, where
the trial judge found the conviction based upon evidence insufficient to rebut
the presumption of innocence.
"'For example, the courts might find the denial of counsel- by a member
of the bar to deprive the student of due process. See note 61 supra.
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 12.
' The referee had the same power to commit a witness for contempt as
a judge of superior court. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52434 (Sipp. 1963)-. " ,
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, provides: "No person . . ., shall be' compelld
ih any criminal case to be a witness against himself . .. 2. See generjiy
Claflin, The Self-Incrimination Clause, 42 A.BA.J. 935 (1956).
'Malloy v. Hogan, 187 A.2d 744% (cGnn': 1963).," .
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The state court reasoned that the fourteenth amendment did not
protect a state witness against self-incrimination and that the peti-
tioner's claim of the state privilege6 was not justified because he
had failed to show any "real and appreciable" danger of self-in-
crimination.7
The Supreme Court reversed,' holding that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment includes the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. It also held that the states must
apply the standard used by the federal courts to determine whether
a witness's claim of the fifth amendment privilege is justified. In
applying this standard, the Court held that petitioner's claim of the
privilege was justified because a response to the questioning "might
furnish a link in the chain of evidence" for future prosecution.0
The decision overruled Twining v. New Jersey ° and Adamson
v. California," which held the fourteenth amendment did not in-
clude a privilege against self-incrimination, by the incorporation of
the fifth amendment or otherwise. In these decisions, the Court
had characterized the privilege as a "rule of evidence."12 and said
that it was not inherent in "due process."" Twining left the states
free to treat the privilege in any manner they deemed proper.
However, all states did have a privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, by either constitutional provision'4 or judicial decision.' 5 The
SCoNN. CONsT. art. I, § 9, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused... shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself ...
See notes 21-22 infra and accompanying text.
*378 U.S. at 3.
See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
10211 U.S. 78 (1908). Accord, Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961);
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); In re Citroen, 170 F. Supp. 93
(E.D.N.Y. 1959); Brown v. State, 173 Miss. 542, 161 So. 465 (1935);
In re Briggs, 135 N.C. 118, 47 S.E. 403 (1904).
11332 U.S. 46 (1947).
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 104-05 (1908).
1 But see Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 68 (1947), where he contended that any act which violated the
Bill of Rights also violated the fourteenth amendment. See Note, The
Fourteenth Amendment Challenged, 36 GEo. L.J. 398 (1948). For discus-
sion of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination, see Pittman,
The Colonial and Constitutional History of The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. Rnv. 763 (1935).
" E.g., N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 11, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
every person charged with a crime has a right to . . . not be compelled
to give self-incriminating evidence." For other jurisdictions, see 8 WIG-
moRz, EviDENCz § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMoRE].1"Koenck v. Cooney, 244 Iowa 153, 55 N.W.2d 269 (1952); State v.
White, 27 N.J. 158, 142 A.2d 65 (1958).
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point where the majority of the states differed from the federal
courts was in the test or standard used to determine whether a
claim of the privilege was justified in any particular instance.1
6
More specifically, these states differed from the federal courts in
the manner a judge decided whether an answer might be incriminat-
ing. They used the standard of an early English case, Regina v.
Boyes,'7 in determining whether a claim of the privilege was justi-
fied. That standard was stated as follows:
The Court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the
nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that
there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger .... The danger
to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference
to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things
-not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, hav-
ing reference to some extraordinary and barely possible con-
tigency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to
influence his conduct.
8
A trial judge exercised his discretion in determinating whether an
answer might be incriminating.' If there were no evidence from
which a judge could infer a reasonable apprehension, he could re-
quire a witness to show a possible danger.20 The Connecticut court
applied this test in finding the petitioner in contempt. It found that
petitioner had no "reasonable ground" to fear self-incrimination be-
cause: (1) any prosecution that might arise from answering the
first five questions was barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions ;21- (2) petitioner refused "to show" how an answer to the
first five questions could possibly incriminate him2 and (3) Bergoti
was not described or identified on the record as having been en-
gaged in or as having been convicted of any type of unlawful
activity.
10WIGMORE § 2271.
1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861). Accord, McCathy v.
Clancy, 110 Conn. 482, 148 Ati. 551 (1930); Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326
Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192 (1951); LaFountaine v. Southern Underwriters,
83 N.C. 132 (1880). Contra, State v. Chitwood, 73 Ariz. 314, 240 P.2d
1202 (1952); Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1959).
1 B. & S. at 330-31, 121 Eng. Rep. at 738.
WIGmORE § 2271.
"See, e.g., In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 93 A.2d 183 (1952).
21 Questions (1) through (5) were directed to the date of his prior
arrest for gambling.
" Petitioner did not offer evidence that he had left the state during the
applicable time so as to stop the statute of limitation from running.
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On the other hand, the federal standard as set forth in Hoffm"an
v. United States2 3 says,
the privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in
themselves support a conviction... but likewise embraces those
which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute. . . . However if the witness, upon interposing his
claim, were required to prove the hazard . . . he would be com-
pelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is
designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be
evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.
2 4
Furthermore, it was said in Hoffman that in applying this stand-
ard the judge must be "perfectly clear" that the answer "cannot
possibly" have a tendency to incriminate.25 But United States v.
Coffey,20 quoted with approval by the Court, 7 indicates that a judge
rarely can be "perfectly clear," by saying that "in determining
whether the witness really apprehends danger in answering a ques-
tion, the judge cannot permit himself to be skeptical; rather must
he be acutely aware that in the deviousness of crime and its detection
incrimination may be apprehended and achieved by obscure and un-
likely lines of inquiry."28  In short, a judge applying the federal
standard has little discretion in determining whether an answer
might be incriminating.2 9 The difference between the prevalent
state standard and the federal standard is illustrated by the Court's
holding in Malloy that petitioner's claim was justified.80 The Court's
reasoning was that petitioner might apprehend self-incrimination if
the person who ran the gambling operation was still engaged in
" 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
'Id. at 486-87. See Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.
1952).
2 341 U.S. at 488.
198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952).
378 U.S. at 13 n.9.
198 F.2d at 440-41.
See WIG EOa § 2271; Falknor, Self-Incrimination Privilege: "Links
in the Chain," 5 VAND. L. Rv. 479 (1952). But cf. Hoffman, Whom Are
We Protecting? Some Thoughts on The Fifth Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J.
582 (1954). -.'Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr, Justice Clark, dissented. 378 U.S.
at 14. Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, also dissented.
Id. at 33. This bare minority was of the opinion that the contempt convic-
tion was proper even under the Hoffman standard.
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unlawful activity. If this were so, said the Court, a response by
petitioner might link him with a more recent crime for which he
could be prosecuted." Thus, the real question involved in Malloy
was whether the federal standard for justifying a claim of the
privilege should have been the applicable standard. But, before the
.federal standard could be applied to the states, the Court had to
find that the fourteenth amendment included the privilege against
self-incrimination.
In dealing .with the .constitutional question, the Court empha-
sized that our system of criminal prosecution is "accusatorial . . .
and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay."32
The Court looked for support to what it regarded as analogous
situations in which the due process clause is held to prohibit the
states from using either an accused's coerced confession 33 or evi-
dence obtained by illegal search and seizure. 4 Mr. Justice Gold-
berg equated the privilege against self-incrimination with coerced
confession and concluded:
Since the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from in-
ducing a person to confess . ." far short of "compulsion by
torture" . . . it follows dfortiori that it also forbids the States to
resort to imprisonment,-as here,'to-compel him to answer "ques-
tions that might incriminate him.' The Fourteenth Amendment
secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right
of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the un-
f ettered exercise of his own will, and .to su~ffer no penalty... for
such silence.
35
The investigation was a "wide-ranging inquiry into crime," and, the
questions attempted to elicit the identity of the person who ran the. tn-
lawful gambling operation. It felt that the state failed to take note of the
"implications of. the question, in the setting in which it [was] asked." 378
U.S. at 14.
Id. at 7.
E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See generally Com-
ment, The Coerced Confession Cases inSearch of A Rationale, 31 U. Cal.
L. REv. 313 (1964).
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development and
Applicattion, 35 So. CALIF. L., REv. 64 (1961).
" 378 U.S. at 8. The Court began'its analogy by citing Bramv. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), whei6 it said "whenever a question arises
whether a confession is inc6fapetent because not voluntary, the, issue is
controlled by . . . the Fifth Amendment [privilege against self-incriqina-
tion] . . . ." But see WIGMORE § 2266; at 400-01, where -it is stated
that the two principles are ,easily "blended" because'each protects a person
from "guilty facts." Brain was cited. Id. at 401 n.1. Wigmore has stated
1964j.
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Furthermore, the Court accepted dictum from Mapp v. Ohio80 that
the fourth and fifth amendments "cojoin" in the fourteenth amend-
ment to prevent an "invasion of the indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property" by the states.8 7 In
so doing, the Court concluded that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment must provide for the privilege against self-
incrimination. 8
The opinion rejected the idea that the fourteenth amendment
applies only "a watered-down, subjected version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights." 9 In holding that the fourteenth
amendment privilege was the same as the fifth amendment's and
that the standard for determining when it can be invoked is the
federal standard, the Court relied upon prior decisions maintain-
ing such uniformity in incorporating the first,4 0 fourth,4 1 and sixth
amendments 42 into the fourteenth amendment. The Court also
stated that it would be inconsistent to have two standards determin-
ing whether the same privilege might be invoked.4 8 The effect of
Malloy is that a state witness need only say he refuses to answer
on the grounds that such might incriminate him, and he then re-
that it is erroneous in history and in policy to compare the two: (1) they
evolved one hundred years apart to meet different needs; (2) the privilege
is confined to legal testimony, but the confession protection is not confined
to such time and place; and (3) the privilege applied to civil proceedings
as well as to criminal prosecutions. Id. at 401.
367 U.S. 643, 646-47, 657 (1961). See generally Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of The Self-Incrimination Clause (pts. 1-2), 29 MiH.
L. R v. 1, 191 (1931).
87 378 U.S. at 8-9.
" Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. 378 U.S. at 14. He feared the decision,
while rejecting the "wholesale incorporation" idea, as going too far in
accepting the fourteenth amendment as "a shorthand directive to this Court
to pick and choose among the provisions of the first eight Amendments and
apply those chosen, freighted with their entire accompanying body of federal
doctrine, to law enforcement in the States." Id. at 15. For a discussion of
"wholesale incorporation," see Note, Constitutional Law-Was It Intended
That the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 42 N.C.L.
REV. 925 (1964).
"1 378 U.S. at 10-11. Mr. Justice Harlan did not accept the Court's
automatic application of the federal standard. He thought that the Court
should decide each case individually and, if a state proceeding did not
fulfill the requirements of the fourteenth amendment, that the Court should
apply some standard of "fundamental fairness." Id. at 20-28.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
't Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"378 U.S. at 11.
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ceives the same protection from the fourteenth amendment as a
federal witness gets under the fifth amendment.
The Supreme Court considered another aspect of the privilege
against self-incrimination in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n.4"
Petitioners refused to answer questions put to them at a state hear-
ing on the grounds that such might incriminate them. To compel
their testimony they were granted immunity from prosecution under
state law.45 Petitioners then refused to answer on the grounds that
their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law
from which the states have no power to grant immunity.48 They
were held in contempt, and this decision was affirmed by the state
court4 7 which said that the only immunity necessary to compel their
testimony was the state immunity. The state court reiterated the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Murdock,4 s which is
stated thus:
[T]he lack of state power to give witnesses protection against
federal prosecution does not defeat a state immunity statute. The
principle established is that full and complete immunity against
prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer
is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against
compulsory self-incrimination.4 9
The Supreme Court, however, rejected"0 its previous decisions
and held that a state witness is protected by the privilege against
incriminating himself "under federal as well as state law."51 The
Court further stated "the constitutional rule to be that a state wit-
ness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incrimi-
nating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its
fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connec-
"378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Being a bi-state body, the Commission granted them immunity from
prosecution under the laws of New York and New Jersey. Id. at 53 n.2.
"Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905). See Feldman v. United States,
322 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1944); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141,
149 (1931) ; State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 305, 82 So. 2d 12, 19 (1955);
Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N.Y. 423, 438, 154 N.E. 298, 302 (1926).
"IIn re Application Waterfront Comm'n, 39 N.J. 436, 189 A.2d 36
(1963). The state court upheld the civil contempt conviction, but reversed
the criminal contempt on the ground that the dual proceeding deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to show evidence in their behalf.
1'284 U.S. 141 (1931). This case was discussed in Grant, Federalism
and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 549 (1957).
" 284 U.S. at 149.
30 378 U.S. at 77.51 Id. at 78.
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tion with a criminal prosecution against him." 2 To allow the states
to compel self-incriminating testimony under the immunity statute,
the Court, by exercising its supervisory powers,5 3 prohibited the
federal government, "from making any . . .use of compelled testi-
mony and its fruits."54 Although the contempt conviction could
have been affirmed, the Court vacated it and remanded the case to
the state court on the ground that "fairness dictates that petitioners
should now be afforded an opportunity, in light of this develop-
ment, to answer the questions." 55
The now discarded rule of Murdock flowed from the theory
that the' federal government and the state governments are dual
sovereignties, "separate and distinct . . ., acting independently of
each other," even though both exercise their powers within the same
geographical limits.5" The Court emphasized "dual sovereignty" in
construing the privilege and consequently held that neither sover-
eignty had to recognize the possibility of a witness incriminating
himself under the laws of the other.5 7 To force a witness to testify,
the compelling sovereignty had to grant the witness an immunity
that was "coextensive" with the displaced privilege,"' i.e., a protec-
tion that was equal in scope to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.59 Since a witness was protected only against incriminating
5 Id. at 79-
"' The Court has "supervisory authority" to formulate rules of evidence
in the federal courts. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"378 U.S. at 79. For discussion of the development of the federal
exclusionary rule, see Day & Berkman, Search dnd Seizure and the Ex-
clusionary Ride: A Re-Examination in the Wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 13 W.
REs. L. REv. 56 (1962).
378 U.5. at 80.
"Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858). See Feld-
man v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Robinson,
74 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Ark. 1947); State ex rel. Gibbs v. Gordon, 138
Fla. 312, 189 So. 437 (1939).
"' See Grant, Federalism and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 549
(1957); Grant, Immunity From Compulsory Self-Incrimination in A Fed-
era'Systemof G'overnment, 9 T.EP. L.Q. 194 (1935). Cf. Fisher, Double
Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cni. L.
REv. 591 (1961); Comment, Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty, 34
WAsir. L. REv. 562 (1959).
" Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291
N.W. 652 (1940).
" For state immunity statutes, see WIGMORE § 2281; for the federal
statute see note 69 infra. See generally Note, The Scope of Statutory hln-
munity Required by The Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Privilege, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 561 (1963).
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himself under the laws of the interrogating sovereignty,-he had-t6
be protected only against prosecution by that sovereignty in order
to compel him to give self-incriminating statements.6 0 Therefore,
a state witness could be prosecuted in the federal courts for a crime
he had admitted under the compulsion of a state immunity statute.6'
In Murphy, the Court rejected the emphasis on "dual sovereign-
ty" because it felt prior decisions were based on a misconception
of English law.62 A construction of the privilege which recognized
and justified a claim of the privilege for fear of subsequent prose-
cution in another sovereignty was accepted.63 The Court quoted
with approval the statement by Chief Justice Marshall that "a party
is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to
penalties . ". 6
This extention of the privilege to protect a state witness against
"°United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). Accord, United
States v. Pagano, 171 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Ferris, 175
Kan. 704, 267 P.2d 190 (1954); Wyman v. DeGregory, 101 N.H. 171, 137
A.2d 512 (1957); In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8,,93 A.2d 176 (1952); LaFountaine
v. Southern Underwriters, 83 N.C. 132 (1880); State v. Morgan, 164
Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 104 (1956); State v. Wood, 99 Vt. 490, 134 Atl.
697 (1926). Contra, United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 605 (N.D.
Ohio 1952) (where the federal investigation concerned violation of state
as well as federal law); State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla.
1954); Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956); Lousiana
v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 82 So. 2d 12 (1955); In re Schniter, 295
Mich." 736, 295 N.W. 478 (1940).
"1 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944). Subsequent prosecu-
tion would probably be barred if there was evidence of collusion between the
federal and the state government. Id. at 494 (dictum). Immunity granted
by the federal government bars subsequent state prosecution. See notes
69 & 70 infra.
02378 U.S. at 77.
" The Court cited the following three cases: (1) United States v. McRae,
L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (C.A. 1867), where the defendant was an alleged Confederate
agent in England. Being questioned- about his affiliations, he refused to
answer on the ground that he could be made to forfeit his property under
an American statute. The Court held that the privilege was properly
asserted on the basis that there was a justified fear of imminent prosecu-
tion in another jurisdiction. (2) Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906),
which held that a federal witness could not be compelled to testify when
his refusal was clearly justified by a fear of subsequent state prosecution.
At the time the witness was testifying in the federal court, he was being
prosecuted by Ohio. (3) United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. (1. Pet.)
100 (1828), where a bill was brought into a federal court to examine the
defendant's books. Being an unincorporated bank in violation of a Virginia
statute, the defendant refused to answer the questions on the ground of
fearing subsequent prosecution in a state court. The Court held that the
privilege was ,properly invoked and the defendant could not be compelled
to answer." Id. at 104. (Emphasis added.)
19641
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incriminating himself "under federal as well as state law" left the
states unable to compel a witness to testify, because, not having the
power to grant immunity from federal prosecution, 5 they could
not give an immunity "coextensive" with the privilege they sought
to take away. The Court recognized that the rule which it set forth
would prevent the states from compelling valuable testimony. To
accommodate state investigation, the Court provided an exclusion-
ary rule which forbids the use of state compelled testimony in
federal courts.66
While the Court stated that a federal witness is protected against
incriminating himself "under state as well as federal law," 7 no
change in current practice will be required. The Federal Immunity
Act6" already forbids the use in state courts of testimony com-
pelled under its provisions 9 and thereby satisfies the requirement of
''coextensive" immunity.
In Malloy and Murphy, the Court took additional steps toward
attaining uniformity in criminal procedure. The Court has now
extended most of the Bill of Rights' protections, along with their
accompanying federal standards, to the states through the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. Among these are freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures,"° the right to counsel, 71
freedom from cruel and unusual punishments,72 and the privilege
against self-incrimination.73 The last major provision of the Bill
of Rights which has not been absorbed into the fourteenth amend-
"' See note 46 supra.
60 378 U.S. at 79.
8'Id. at 78.
18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1959), which provides:
[N]o ... witness shall be prosecuted.., on account of any transac-
tion, matter, or thing concerning which he is so compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify
or produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding... against him in any court.
"" Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954). This federal power was
said to be based on the necessary and proper and the supremacy clauses of
the Constitution. Accord, Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960);
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (power was based on the
war clause); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (Congress had power
to prohibit the prosecution itself through the commerce clause).
'6Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment).
"'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment).
2Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment).
"8 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment).
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ment is the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy."'
The Court rejected the incorporation of this protection in Palko v.
Connecticut,"5 where it was held that a conviction of first degree
murder following a reversal of a verdict of second degree murder
at the instance of the state did not violate " 'fundamental principles
of liberty and justice . . .' "" In view of the trend towards view-
ing all Bill of Rights protections as "fundamental principles of




There is also a "dual sovereignty" aspect to double jeopardy.
It is best illustrated by United States v. Lanza,9 in which it was
held that there can be successive federal-state trials and convictions
for offenses based on the same act. The result was based on the rea-
soning that neither sovereignty has to recognize a prosecution by the
other.80 The rejection of "dual sovereignty" as the controlling prin-
ciple in the "silver platter" situation s' and in cases involving self-
incrimination 2 does not, however, necessarily herald a rejection of
it in the Lanza situation. In successive trials by both governments,
each sovereignty is protecting interests deemed vital to it, and is not
capitalizing on "dual sovereignty" to use evidence which is inad-
missible in the courts of the other. However, the Court seems
"U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides: "No person shall . . . be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .. .
" 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
'Old. at 328.
See notes 70-73 supra.
8 Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in The Fourteenth Amendnient, 73
YALE L.J. 74 (1963). The Court should also apply the standard used in
the federal courts in determining when jeopardy attaches. This uniform
standard would eliminate the variation in state standards. See generally
Note, Criminal Law--Double Jeopardy, 24 MINN. L. Ruv. 522 (1940).
7 260 U.S. 377 (1922). See also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959) (defendant convicted in successive federal-state prosecutions for
conspiracy to destroy property); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959)
(defendant acquitted by a federal jury for robbing a bank but subsequently
convicted in a state court for the same robbery); State v. Harrison, 184
N.C. 762, 114 S.E. 830 (1922) (holding that a federal conviction for a
liquor violation does not prohibit a state conviction for the same offense).
80 See note 57 supra.
The Court has discarded the "silver platter" doctrine whereby a state
court could use evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure by federal
officers, and vice versa. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (dictum);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See generally Comment,
The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development
and Application, 35 So. CALIF. L. REV. 64 (1961).
8" Murphy v. Waterfront Conm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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alarmed by the hardships imposed on a defendant by double prose-
cution and should be ready to re-examine Lanza.8
3
COMANN P. CRAVER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Obscenity
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
continue the case by case development of the constitutional stand-
ards to be applied in obscenity cases.'
In the first case, the manager of a motion picture theatre was
convicted of violating the Ohio obscenity statute2 by possessing and
exhibiting a French film, The Lovers.' He waived jury trial and his
conviction by a court of three judges was affirmed by the Ohio
Court of Appeals4 and the Supreme Court of Ohio.' The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction in Jacobellis v. Ohio.6
" In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), the Court held that
through the passage of the Smith Act Congress has occupied the field of
sedition so as to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
This opinion indicated that the Court is looking for congressional intent to
pre-empt the field so as to avoid the harsh burden of double prosecution.
However, in 1959, the Court reiterated the Lanza doctrine in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, and Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented. Id. at 150. Black
emphasized that state prosecution should be upheld only when the federal
government had no vital interest in preventing the crime and if there were
a conflict of interests, state prosecution should be pre-empted so as to avoid
double prosecution. Pre-emption seems too harsh. It predicates state sub-
ordination and diminishes the prerogatives of the states. A more suitable
solution would be for legislatures of both governments to enact pleas in bar
whereby a former prosecution for the same act would prohibit a second
trial.
'For a criticism of the Court's failure to establish a definite test in
obscenity cases, see Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Ob-
scenity, 112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 834, 835 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Gerber].
The opposite view is taken in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscen-
ity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rxv. 5, 121
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart & McClure].
2 "No person shall knowingly . .. exhibit . . . or have in his possession
or under his control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious . . . motion picture
film ... ." OIro REv. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1963).
"'The Lovers' involves a woman bored with her life and marriage
who abandons her husband and family for a young archaeologist with whom
she has suddenly fallen in love. There is an explicit love scene in the last
reel of the film, and the State's objections are based almost entirely upon
that scene." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1964).
'State v. Jacobellis, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 175 N.E.2d 123 (Ct. App.
1961).
State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962).
8378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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